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THE PRESIDENT, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF
POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE OF




Think of the American Republic as a railroad train, with the judges sitting in the ca-
boose, looking backward.  What they see are the mountains and valleys of our dualis-
tic constitutional experience, most notably the peaks of constitutional meaning elabo-
rated during the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal.  As the train moves
forward in history, it is harder for the judges to see the traces of volcanic ash that
marked each mountain’s emergence onto the legal landscape.  At the same time a dif-
ferent perspective becomes available:  As the more recent eruptions move further
into the background, it becomes easier to see that there is now a mountain range out
there that can be described in a comprehensive way.
As this shift is occurring, lots of other things are happening.  Most obviously, old
judges die, and new ones are sent to the caboose from the front of the train by those
who happen to be in the locomotive.  These newcomers’ view of the landscape is
shaped by their own experiences of life and law—as well as the new vistas constantly
opened up on the mountains by the path that the train takes into the future.  The dis-
tinctive thing about the judges, however, is that they remain in the caboose, looking
backward—not in the locomotive arguing over the direction the train should be tak-
ing at the next crossroads, or anxiously observing the passing scene from one of the
passenger cars.  Despite their rearguard position, they are not without a certain power
over the course of events.
[Sometimes] the folks on the caboose begin to apply the brakes. . . .  The train travels
more slowly; the distance between stations shortens.  When the engineers come down
from the locomotive, they have two choices.  They may be apologetic about their poor
service.  Or they may bitterly accuse the old-timers in the caboose of slowing down
progress.  If they take the latter course, the passengers have more than the usual
amount of thinking . . . to do.  It’s their train, isn’t it?
1
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I
INTRODUCTION
A key feature of the American system of the separation of powers is the
role that our Presidents play in shaping the future of American constitutional
law, of the Supreme Court, and of the lower federal judiciary.  Through his
power of nomination and appointment, his power to shape the litigation policy
of the United States, and his ability to propose constitutional amendments and
statutory revisions of constitutional importance, the President inevitably plays a
central role in shaping the constitutional constraints that will confront his suc-
cessors.
This constitution-shaping role of the President is ironic because Americans
take great pride in the fact that “ours is a government of laws and not of men”
and that no one in our constitutional system, not even the President, is above
the law.  The fact that the President is simultaneously subject to constitutional
law and is a maker of constitutional law inevitably creates awkwardness and
difficulties.
Government lawyers, and particularly the Solicitor General of the United
States, are inevitably caught up in the tensions created by the President’s uncer-
tain relationship with the Supreme Court.  In recent years, scholars of that rela-
tionship have put forward three normative theories suggesting how government
lawyers, particularly the Solicitor General, should resolve the President’s and
the Court’s sharply contrasting constitutional visions.  Unsurprisingly, some ar-
gue that government lawyers ought to take their lead from the President,2 oth-
ers that they ought to take their lead from the Court,3 and still others, such as
former Solicitor General Charles Fried, that they should act as partially inde-
pendent Burkean representatives “elected” by the President to “represent” him
before the Court.4
In this short essay, I want to step back from the normative fray and provide
a brief positive account of the complicated relationship between the President
and the Supreme Court with respect to the development of constitutional law.
That relationship has different implications for different individuals who hap-
pen to be government lawyers at any given point in time.
My thesis is that the normative writing to date is fundamentally flawed be-
cause it assumes that all government lawyers play the same role at all times.  I
argue that this rarely, if ever, happens.  Instead, some government lawyers al-
                                                          
2. See John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in Constitu-
tional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992).
3. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF
LAW (1987).  But see Roger Clegg, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk, 1987 DUKE L.J. 964 (reviewing
Caplan’s book critically).
4. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 172-205 (1991).  For an exception to these normative accounts, see Neal Devins, Political
Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 273 (1993), providing a striking and thought-provoking positive account consistent with much of
what I say in this article.
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ways take on the role of presidential advocate, others take on the role of Court-
oriented conservative, and still others serve as ambassador or middleman be-
tween the first two.  These categories are adapted from Nancy Baker’s superb
book about different types of Attorneys General.5  I begin in Part II with a de-
scription of the relationship between the President and the Supreme Court in
developing constitutional law and with a discussion of the implications of that
relationship for different government lawyers.  Part III discusses the different
roles that government lawyers inevitably will play as a result of that relation-
ship.  Both Parts draw upon my own experiences working in the Reagan and
Bush Administrations.6
My positive account suggests reasons why it will always be in the interest of
at least some government lawyers to pursue one of the three roles described
above (advocate, conservative, or ambassador), and I will argue that this dy-
namic is an inevitable and unavoidable byproduct of the incentives created by
the underlying institutional distributions of power.  Normative sloganeering
about a single inherent ideal role for executive branch lawyers is thus revealed
to be a form of rhetoric that should be viewed with skepticism.7
I conclude that all administrations will have some officials who play each of
these three roles to some degree and that the tension among the roles is likely
to be sharpest early in an administration’s history.  In addition, for a number of
important government legal offices, some government lawyers are inherently
more likely to be advocates, others are more likely to be conservatives, and still
others are more likely to be ambassadors.  Finally, I conclude it is likely that no
two administrations will produce exactly the same balance of advocates, con-
servatives, and ambassadors.  Indeed, it is unlikely that even a single admini-
stration will end its term of office with its initial balance of the three groups.
                                                          
5. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789-1990 (1992).  Baker discusses two types of Attorneys General in her book:
advocates and neutrals.  I argue there is a third type as well, ambassadors, and contend that the Baker
typology as modified applies to all executive branch lawyers holding policymaking appointments and
not merely to Attorneys General.
6. I served in the Reagan Administration as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General from
1985 to 1987, and as a Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs from
February to June 1987.  I served in the Bush Administration as a speechwriter to Vice President
Quayle in 1990.
My thoughts in this essay grow out of an effort to generalize from those experiences ten years after
most of them occurred, and this essay thus has an autobiographical and even a storytelling element.  I
have tried, however, as much as possible, to avoid writing a personal statement in favor of discussing
and describing more general phenomena which have a greater likelihood of being of permanent inter-
est to others who wish to study the problems this symposium issue addresses.
7. I try scrupulously in this essay to stick to the task of describing the roles I believe are played
by different types of government lawyers.  I avoid passing judgment on those different types of lawyers
and also avoid normative theorizing as much as possible.  For a more general critique of the excessive
normativity of much recent constitutional law theorizing, see Steven G. Calabresi, The Crisis in Con-
stitutional Theory, 83 VA. L. REV. 247 (1997).
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II
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE SUPREME COURT
A core premise of our constitutional system is that the President and his
subordinates are subject to the same laws that bind ordinary private citizens.
The Constitution itself assumes as much since it obligates the President to
“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution”8 and to “take [c]are that the
[l]aws be faithfully executed.”9  Moreover, the Constitution permits the prose-
cution of all executive branch officials, except probably for the President, and
even he can be prosecuted after leaving office.  In the Steel Seizure Case,10 Jus-
tice Jackson emphasized that “ours is a government of laws, not of men and . . .
we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”11  “With all its defects, de-
lays[,] and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long pre-
serving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the
law be made by parliamentary deliberations.”12
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the principle that the President is bound
by the law in countless cases over the last 200 years and has added to this the
notion that sometimes the President’s duty to follow the law requires him to
execute court judgments with which he disagrees.  This principle that the Presi-
dent is subject not only to the law but also that “it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”13 is associated most
famously with Marbury v. Madison,14 Kendall v. United States,15 The Steel Sei-
zure Case, United States v. Nixon,16 and Clinton v. Jones.17  In the last of these
cases—decided only one year ago—the Court said, “[w]e have long held that
when the President takes official action [we have] the authority to determine
whether he has acted within the law. . . .  [I]t is also settled that the President is
subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances.”18  In light of these
cases, and countless others decided over the last 200 years,19 there can be no
doubt either that the President is bound to follow the law or that on occasion
this duty will compel him to follow the mandate of the federal courts by exe-
cuting their judgments rendered in properly brought cases or controversies.20
                                                          
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
10. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
11. Id. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
14. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15. 37 U.S. 524 (1838).
16. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
17. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
18. Id. at 1649 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 ((C.C. Va.
1807) (No. 14,692d))).
19. For a reminder of why the gloss of history is important with respect to matters like these, see
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593-628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
20. Compare Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996) (stating that the President usually is obligated to execute court
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These two duties might fairly be described as axioms of our constitutional sys-
tem.
At the same time, it is no less an axiom of our political system that “no mat-
ter whether th’ constitution follows th’ flag or not, th’ supreme court follows th’
ilection returns.”21  In particular, the Supreme Court and the inferior federal
courts follow the presidential election returns because the President plays the
most important role in reshaping the very federal courts whose mandate he is
from time to time called upon to obey.  Professors Robert Dahl and Gerald
Rosenberg have described the process by which the judiciary is made to follow
the election returns in general,22 and I have previously explained why I think
their findings are descriptively accurate.23  While the Senate plainly is a break
on the President’s power to reshape the federal courts,24 it is nonetheless clear
that the President plays a bigger role in changing the federal courts than does
the Senate.  This is partly the result of the great deference with respect to their
nominations to the inferior federal courts that presidents receive from the Sen-
ate and partly the result of the difficulty the Senate faces in mounting sustained
opposition to presidential efforts to alter the judicial philosophy of the Su-
preme Court.25
The public understands that presidents play an important role in reshaping
the federal courts and indeed the entire justice system.  For this reason, Ameri-
can presidential elections frequently involve debate over legal and constitu-
tional issues.  In my relatively short political lifetime, I have had a chance to
observe many presidential campaigns which addressed legal issues including
                                                          
judgments), with Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (stating that the President is not obligated to execute court judg-
ments).
21. P. Dunne, The Supreme Court’s Decisions, in MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1900).
22. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Pol-
icy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Po-
litical Power, 54 REV. POL. 369 (1992); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
23. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 261-63; Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Con-
stitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1451-53
(1997).
24. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1985) (summarizing the history of the nomination
and confirmation of every Supreme Court Justice in American history up to the date of the book’s
publication); see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994) (describing recent confirmation struggles and tragedies).
25. A Senate majority that disagrees with the President on the direction the Supreme Court should
take faces a collective action problem in forcing the President to meet the majority’s concerns.  The
unity of the executive and the presence of 100 members in the Senate tend to give the President the
upper hand in any negotiations.  Senators will always be tempted to vote against a first nominee with
the President’s views and in favor of a second nominee because this outcome pleases all sides the most.
This allows Senators to be both for and against originalism, for example, an often though not always
optimal reelection strategy.  Often only a relatively small number of Senators need defect from a ma-
jority coalition for this reason in order for a President to get his nominees approved.  For these rea-
sons, the Senate is able to function at most as a brake on the President’s ambitions to transform the
Supreme Court.  It is not ordinarily an equal partner in the selection of justices.  Only a very large and
very determined Senate majority could hope to play such a role successfully.
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Richard Nixon’s campaign with its emphasis on restoring law and order; Jimmy
Carter’s emphasis on restoring government under the law; Ronald Reagan’s
emphasis on judicial activism, abortion, school prayer, over-regulation, and big
government; George Bush’s emphasis on the Nixonian themes of law and or-
der; and Bill Clinton’s emphasis on abortion and women’s rights.  In other
words, every presidential election I can remember has involved, to some extent,
the likely impact that the winning candidate will have on the future direction of
the Supreme Court and of the legal system in general.  Nor does this state of af-
fairs appear to be idiosyncratic to the modern era.  Abraham Lincoln,26 Frank-
lin Roosevelt,27 and Lyndon Johnson all ran for office in part by promising to
make changes in the Supreme Court or in the overall legal system.28
It follows thus that American Presidents must, as a practical matter, have
some kind of program for the Supreme Court and for the legal system as a
whole.  This obligation to have a “program” is a real world political obligation;
it is different from the more theoretical obligation that Presidents face to inter-
pret independently and to enforce the Constitution and laws of the United
States.29  Whether one agrees or not with the many executive officials and con-
stitutional scholars who have argued for departmentalism or coordinate review,
it is emphatically the case that all Presidents must, as a political matter, have
some goals in mind while staffing the legal positions in their administrations
and while deciding upon their court nominations.  As I noted briefly above, this
has certainly been the case for the whole of my political lifetime.
There are good reasons why presidential elections often turn to some extent
on issues of legal policy and why Presidents must, as a practical matter, have
some kind of program for the Supreme Court and for the legal system as a
whole.  The voters, and particularly the opinion-shaping elite that advises the
voters, are aware that the President inevitably plays a major role in shaping the
                                                          
26. See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1861, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (R. Basler ed., 1953):
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions,
affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the
instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people
will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent, practically resigned their gov-
ernment, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
27. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A
CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941) (describing the intellectual and political events impor-
tant to President Roosevelt’s successful attempt to transform the Supreme Court); Letter and accom-
panying essay from Professor Felix Frankfurter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Feb. 18, 1937),
reprinted in ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-45, at 383 (Max
Freedman ed., 1967) (same).
28. See also FEDERALIST SOCIETY, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION?  THE DEBATE OVER
INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY (1992) (collecting famous statements by Presidents and their aides made
over the last 200 years advocating independent Executive Branch interpretation of the Constitution in
the hope that such independent interpretation would eventually lead to changes in Supreme Court doc-
trine).
29. See id; Lawson & Moore, supra note 20; Edwin Meese, III, The Law of the Constitution, 61
TULANE L. REV. 979 (1987); Paulsen, supra note 20.  I have long believed that Presidents are obli-
gated to interpret the Constitution independently of the Supreme Court, and I assisted in the devel-
opment and editing of General Meese’s Tulane speech when I served as his Special Assistant.
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future of constitutional law.  The President’s constitutional power over federal
judicial appointments, especially Supreme Court appointments, is widely rec-
ognized and for many is an important consideration in casting votes for the
presidency.30  In a close election, a presidential candidate’s position on issues of
judicial appointments potentially could be decisive.
Moreover, the public probably has an intuitive sense that the President can
affect the law enforcement philosophy of the Executive Branch.  This intuition,
of course, is by no means a misguided one.  After all, the President appoints all
federal judges31 and the top leadership of the Justice Department, including all
of the U.S. Attorneys, as well as the General Counsels of the Cabinet Depart-
ments and agencies.  He thus appoints virtually all of the leading law enforce-
ment personnel in the government and all of the leading litigators in the gov-
ernment, including most importantly the Solicitor General (who represents the
United States before the Supreme Court).  Finally, the President, with the help
and guidance of his legal advisers, recommends to the Congress new laws32 and,
on occasion, even new constitutional amendments.33  Some of these laws and
amendments seek to overturn federal court decisions through the political
process.34  Thus, through his recommendation power, his veto power, and his
ability to control the national policymaking agenda, the President has yet addi-
tional levers over national legal policy.
The general public is probably not aware of the more subtle ways in which
the President can influence legal policy, but the many journalists who cover the
Executive Branch do convey to the public the general sense that who the Presi-
                                                          
30. During the Reagan years, for example, widespread interest in and concern over the President’s
power to reshape the federal judiciary touched off a furious explosion of pamphleting.  Compare
DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992);
HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE
CONSTITUTION (1988), with GARY L. MCDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS: THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER (1988); THE JUDGES WAR: THE SENATE, LEGAL CULTURE,
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION (Patrick B. McGuigan & Jeffrey P. O’Connell
eds., 1987).
31. For thorough historical discussions of how Presidents have used their power of judicial ap-
pointment to implement ideas about the proper judicial role, see HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND
PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 371 (3d ed. 1992)
(“There is, of course, nothing wrong in a president’s attempt to staff the Court with jurists who read
the Constitution his way.  All presidents have tried to pack the Court, to mold it in their images.”);
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
32. Recent, well known examples of laws that President Clinton sought from Congress include the
Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 2a, 110 Stat. 1200 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691 (Supp.
II 1996)); the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (a.k.a. “welfare reform,” codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); and the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.  Although President Clinton recom-
mended these laws, they were of course significantly revised by Congress before it adopted them.
33. President Reagan, for example, endorsed a number of constitutional amendments, including
the Balanced Budget Amendment, a Human Life Amendment (to permit the outlawing of abortion),
and a School Prayer Amendment (to legalize prayer in public schools).
34. The School Prayer Amendment was so motivated, as was the recent proposed amendment put
foreword by President Bush to reempower Congress and the States to outlaw burning or desecrating
the American flag.
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dent is matters for how legal policy issues are decided.  In subtle and unsubtle
ways, the public learns what the President’s views are on matters of legal policy,
and this awareness influences decisions about reelection and about the election
of successors.
Different Presidents will inevitably have different ambitions when it comes
to matters of legal policy.  Some administrations—such as Franklin Roosevelt’s,
Richard Nixon’s, or Ronald Reagan’s—will have transformative doctrinal aspi-
rations:  They made it a major goal of their administrations to change the Su-
preme Court and to alter its doctrine in specific ways.  Other administrations—
such as Harry Truman’s or Gerald Ford’s—have had more modest goals.  In
Ford’s case, the need to restore faith in the rule of law in the wake of Richard
Nixon’s transgressions and resignation proved to be of overriding importance
to any particular substantive end.35
An administration’s legal policy aspirations are shaped by the political con-
text in which the President attains office and in which he must serve.  FDR’s
depression-era struggle with the laissez faire attitudes of the Four Horsemen,
Nixon’s opposition to the criminal law opinions of the Warren Court, Reagan’s
opposition to the abortion and Religion Clause jurisprudence of the Burger
Court, and Ford’s Rule of Law appointments of Attorney General Ed Levi and
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens all reflect the political milieu of the times.
Aside from political considerations, some Presidents for personality reasons
may want to be remembered as great law givers or constitution shapers.  One of
the incentives to seek the presidency is the desire for fame and glory.  For this
reason, most incumbent Presidents spend a great deal of time and energy trying
to shape a legacy.  One type of legacy is a reputation for having been a great
law giver or constitution shaper.  The vainglorious Napoleon in exile on St.
Helena is said to have “referred to [his] Code as a greater achievement than all
his [military] victories:  ‘One Waterloo wipes out their memory, but my civil
code will live forever.’”36  Similarly, some Presidents may want to achieve fame
and greatness in part by being remembered as the Moses or the Solon or the
Justinian or the James Madison of their era.  Presidents can do this in our sys-
tem of government is by transforming the Supreme Court and thus remaking
constitutional law and the legal system.
Presidents with great historical ambitions (like Washington, Jefferson, Jack-
son, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Reagan) may often have or come to have
                                                          
35. Nancy Baker demonstrates that President Ford’s post-Watergate scandal desire for a rule of
law Attorney General is part of a more general post-scandal pattern.  See BAKER, supra note 5, at 126-
65.  Professor Baker notes that President Chester Arthur felt it appropriate to appoint Benjamin
Brewster to be Attorney General after the “Star Route” Scandal for similar reasons, and that Presi-
dent Calvin Coolidge similarly chose Harlan Fiske Stone, former Dean of the Columbia Law School, to
be Attorney General after the disastrous back-to-back tenures of Harry Daugherty (the scandal-
plagued Attorney General under President Warren G. Harding) and A. Mitchell Palmer (President
Woodrow Wilson’s third and final Attorney General who presided over the Justice Department during
the notorious Red Raids).
36. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 54 (2d ed. 1994).
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great constitutional and legal ambitions as well.37  The two ambitions have al-
ways been closely connected over the course of human history, and this connec-
tion continues to exist in American constitutional politics.  The historical suc-
cess of the U.S. Constitution makes it difficult for ambitious American
politicians to leave a legacy like the Fifth Republic Constitution that Charles
DeGaulle bequeathed to France.  Ambitious American politicians thus must
settle for the next best option of bequeathing a constitutional transformation
made up either of judicial appointments or of constitutional amendments and
framework statutes.  Many have sought and achieved glory in this way.  Lincoln
and Roosevelt are prime examples, as are, to a more limited extent, Jackson,
Taft, Nixon, and Reagan.
Whatever the scope of a President’s legal ambitions, he needs lawyers
working for him to implement them.  No President has the time and skill re-
quired to interview scores of judicial candidates,38 to think up and draft consti-
tutional amendments,39 framework statutes, and executive orders,40 to edit or
comment upon the United States’ briefs in the Supreme Court,41 or to shape
and conduct the general law enforcement and litigation strategies of the federal
                                                          
37. All of these Presidents except Roosevelt clearly arrived in office with major agendas for con-
stitutional law, agendas which to a substantial degree they each succeeded in realizing.  Whether these
agendas were driven by substantive concerns of public policy or by a desire to leave a legacy is difficult
to say and the answer may vary according to the President.  All of these Presidents, however, either
had or came to have major constitutional ambitions that were ultimately realized.  Washington put the
Constitution in place and legitimized it; Jefferson succeeded for a time in shrinking the role of the na-
tional government; Jackson strengthened the presidency and thwarted nullification; Lincoln conceptu-
alized the successful attack on Dred Scott, shaped the legal case against the constitutionality of seces-
sion, and developed the doctrine of presidential emergency war powers; and Reagan successfully
ended the national governments 60-year post-New Deal winning streak before the Supreme Court and
for a time curtailed substantive due process.  In Franklin Roosevelt’s case, it is arguable that his consti-
tution-shaping ambitions postdated his election as President and developed in reaction to the Supreme
Court’s invalidation of parts of the New Deal legislative agenda.  By 1937, however, FDR had become
one of our most committed Constitution-shaping Presidents with a desire “to save the Constitution
from the Court and the Court from itself” if necessary by packing the Court with “Justices who will act
as Justices and not as legislators.”  6 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 123-29
(1937 Volume), reprinted in LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 93 (1992).
38. Presidents Reagan and Bush, for example, relied on their legal staffs to interview all judicial
candidates, reserving for themselves only a final interview with a handful of contenders for vacancies
on the Supreme Court.
39. President Bush, for example, relied on lawyers in the White House Counsel’s office to draft his
proposed amendment outlawing burning of the American flag.
40. White House and Justice Department lawyers for President Reagan produced important ex-
ecutive orders on subjects ranging from the review of decisions by regulatory agencies, to enforcement
by the Executive Branch of principles inherent in the Takings Clause, to enforcement by the Executive
Branch of core aspects of American constitutional federalism, and to the prevention of the use of gov-
ernment funds to encourage women to seek abortions.
41. Presidents Reagan and Bush essentially relied exclusively on their lawyers in the Justice De-
partment and mainly in the Solicitor General’s office to develop and edit briefs for cases in the Su-
preme Court.  A few of their predecessors have on rare occasion personally reviewed or edited a brief.
President Dwight Eisenhower, for example, is reported to have edited the brief in Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), and President Jimmy Carter is reported to have reviewed his Admini-
stration’s brief in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  See Clegg, su-
pra note 3, at 965-66.
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government.42  All of these activities require help from lawyers, and, as a result,
all Presidents must make use of the assistance of thousands of lawyers in the
Justice Department, the White House Counsel’s Office, and the Cabinet De-
partments and agencies.  All exercises of presidential leadership require dele-
gation to subordinates, and the exercises of presidential leadership in the legal
policy arena are no different.
Coordinating the activities of the thousands of executive branch employees
who are lawyers or even of the hundreds who hold top political legal jobs is a
difficult task for any administration; it is especially difficult with respect to legal
policy issues.  Executive branch lawyers face problems that differ from those
faced by lawyers working in private practice, for non-profit corporations, for
Congress, and in the federal and state courts.  Two problems in particular are
worth mentioning.
First, it is sometimes unclear who the client is to whom an Executive
Branch lawyer owes loyalty.43  If the lawyer is a political appointee, he will have
obligations both to the United States and to the President (or presidential sub-
ordinate) who appointed him.  Sometimes different presidential subordinates
will have different legal agendas.  This can create serious tensions for a consci-
entious advocate.  Moreover, these tensions are augmented by the additional
tensions that arise when a President or presidential subordinate has a legal
policy that is contrary to the interests of the national government or of the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
Should a lawyer working for Ronald Reagan defend broad new federal
statutes that burden the states44 or that delegate unprecedented and sweeping
powers to agencies within the Executive Branch?45  Should such a lawyer give
primacy to Reagan’s long-stated goal of shrinking the size of government and
of restoring the Constitution envisioned by the Framers?  Does it matter if
President Reagan himself lobbied for and signed the legislation that appears to
conflict with his overall legal philosophy?46  What should a lawyer working for
President Clinton do when faced with the so called “Don’t ask, don’t tell” gays-
in-the-military policy?  Defend the policy Clinton sought and the Defense De-
partment supports, or defend what is probably the President’s quiet enthusiasm
for the social changes hinted at in Romer v. Evans47 (a decision that would have
                                                          
42. Presidents Reagan and Bush both, for example, relied on their legal staffs to change law en-
forcement and litigation policies with respect to such contested matters as the scope of antitrust law,
civil rights law, or the U.S. government’s posture in takings cases.
43. For a discussion, see BAKER, supra note 5, at 28-36.
44. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding strings attached to federal highway
funds that put pressure on the States to adopt a drinking age of 21).
45. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988) (upholding sweeping delegation of powers
to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, an executive branch entity that—as Justice Scalia’s lone dissent
pointed out—both the Court majority and Congress wrongly claimed was part of the judicial branch).
46. President Reagan’s Administration, for example, lobbied for the creation of the Sentencing
Commission, and Reagan himself signed the statutes creating the Commission and putting pressure on
the States to raise their drinking ages to 21.
47. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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been impossible without the votes of his two appointees to the Supreme
Court)?48
Questions like these must of necessity come up in every administration.
This is plainly true for lawyers holding political appointments.  It is true to
some degree as well even for civil service employees; even if they are only re-
movable for cause, the President is the fountain of the executive power and all
who work in the Executive Branch are his subordinates in exercising executive
power.  The President’s understanding of what it means to execute the law is
thus always an issue that ought to be of some importance to career executive
branch employees.
A second problem executive branch lawyers face is identifying the audience
they are ultimately trying to persuade.  For many practicing lawyers (although
not all), that audience is a judge or several appellate judges.  Some high-
ranking executive branch lawyers, however, such as the White House Counsel
or the Attorney General, may have to worry about multiple audiences, includ-
ing the current and future Supreme Courts, the inferior federal courts, future
historians, the current general public, the media (to the extent it covers legal
issues), the Senate (especially the Senate Judiciary Committee through which
all judicial and executive branch legal nominations must pass), the House of
Representatives and its Judiciary Committee (which has the power of im-
peachment), and finally the other executive branch lawyers who may or may
not agree with the relevant legal agenda.
Lawyers in administrations with ambitious legal agendas will face a much
more complicated audience problem.  They also have to endure short-term de-
feats, especially in the courts, while trying to persuade the general public, the
Senate, and ultimately future historians and constitutional scholars of the cor-
rectness of the administration’s constitutional vision.  Such a long-term project
requires bold statements, briefs, and proposals for amendments or statutes that
will frighten or anger the courts.  Persuading the courts and other status quo
oriented groups like the American Bar Association calls for painting in pale
pastels, but persuading future generations often requires painting in bold pri-
mary colors.49
Administrations with more cautious legal agendas will not face this diffi-
culty, but even they suffer to some extent from audience problems.  In an era
characterized by split party control of the White House and the Senate, admini-
stration lawyers will always face a tough challenge finding suitable judicial
nominees to send before the Senate.  The lawyers involved in judicial selection
are caught between the legal agenda of the President and the often diametri-
cally opposed legal agenda of the opposition political party then dominant in
the Senate.
                                                          
48. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer both joined justice Kennedy’s 6-to-3 ma-
jority opinion in Romer, thus guaranteeing that it would be a majority opinion.
49. This was a favorite metaphor of President Reagan’s, repeated often in his early speeches after
taking office.
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Both President Bush and President Clinton faced this difficulty and paid a
political price because of it.  The Bush Administration was criticized by conser-
vatives for its disappointing selection of Justice Souter for a seat on the Su-
preme Court and for its decision to sign and support several statutes expanding
business liability for employment discrimination.  On the other hand, Senate
democrats between 1989 and 1993 were appalled by the Clarence Thomas
nomination and found much to object to in many of Bush’s other judicial nomi-
nations.  Similarly, President Clinton has disappointed many liberals who had
hoped he would appoint outspoken Brennanites to the federal bench.  At the
same time, he has incurred the wrath of Republican Senators for appointing too
many liberals.
Finally, audience problems inhere in the job that any executive branch law-
yer must perform because the Executive Branch cannot write off any of the dif-
ferent audiences it is obligated (at least sometimes) to try to persuade.  Every
President wants to persuade future Supreme Courts, historians, the general
public, and the media of the wisdom of his approach to legal policy and law en-
forcement.  Every President must persuade the Senate to confirm his judicial
and executive legal nominees.  Every President must persuade the House to
appropriate funds for law execution purposes.  Every President must persuade
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts to follow at least some of its
construction of federal laws.  And every President must persuade lower-level
executive branch employees to follow his legal agenda at least some of the
time.
The fact that Presidents are as a practical matter obligated to worry about
all of these different audiences makes the job of executive branch lawyers un-
usually difficult.  Presidents must have both a core legal agenda and a variety of
fall back positions, and these different agendas must to some extent be com-
municated to different audiences at the same time and in public.  Presidents
with ambitious legal agendas like FDR and Reagan will face an especially try-
ing task.
One tool Presidents have at their disposal for accomplishing this task is ap-
pointing different kinds of lawyers to different kinds of legal jobs in their ad-
ministration.  Cautious advocates might be charged with writing briefs for the
Supreme Court, for example, while bolder lawyers might be recruited to work
on judicial selection.  Part III below elaborates this argument; suffice it to say
that it is very unlikely that a President would want to have the same kinds of
advocates making the same kinds of arguments to all of the many different
audiences he is obligated to try to persuade.  Thus the President’s own needs
and the incentive structure he faces are likely to push him and his top legal ad-
visers toward different kinds of attorneys for different executive branch legal
positions.
Those lawyers in turn are likely to have different conceptions of which
audience they should focus on and on who their client is.  For example, execu-
tive branch lawyers arguing before the Supreme Court are in general likely to
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focus on the present justices as their audience and will often think that the
United States is their client.  Lawyers involved in judicial selection, on the
other hand, may tend to think that future constitutional scholars, future Su-
preme Courts, historians, the general public, the media, and above all the Sen-
ate are their audience, while the President in whose administration they work
and the voters who elected him are their clients.
III
THE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT LAWYERS IN MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
If the supposition of distinct audiences is correct, it poses a major challenge
for two different normative theories of the role executive branch lawyers ought
to play.  The first such theory—the departmentalist theory—was very much in
vogue in the Reagan Administration and is one to which I have long sub-
scribed.  Believers in departmentalism, or “Coordinate Review,” as Michael
Paulsen calls it,50 accept the following set of propositions:  (1) The President has
a right co-equal with that of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution;
(2) all employees of the Executive Branch are legally the President’s subordi-
nates and obtain all their constitutional power by implicit or explicit delegation
from the President; and, therefore, (3) all employees of the Executive Branch
holding legal jobs should follow the President’s line in every respect on all con-
stitutional issues, and it is the job of the Attorney General (and maybe the
White House Counsel) to ensure that every lawyer in every administration toes
the President’s line in every respect.
No scholar has made the departmentalist argument in quite this way, but
Professor John McGinnis comes close in his superb book review of Charles
Fried’s entertaining and thought-provoking memoir of his years as President
Reagan’s Burkean Solicitor General.51  The problem is, however, that the Ex-
ecutive Branch does not work exactly as departmentalists describe it.  The Ex-
ecutive Branch is embedded in a three-branch constitutional structure that re-
quires some executive branch lawyers to spend all or most of their time
communicating with lawyers in one of the other two branches—the courts or
the Congress.  It is inconceivable that lawyers in executive positions of that
kind will have the same view of the law as nonlitigating, nonlobbying judge
pickers or Office of Legal Counsel opinion writers.  Each set of lawyers faces a
very different set of incentives, has a different perception of who the client is,
and works to persuade a different audience.
McGinnis’s position is thus at war with the reality of life in the Executive
Branch, a reality which in turn is set in motion by the constitutional separation
of powers itself and which the President must take into account if he is to enjoy
political success or in some instances if he is to survive in office.  The Constitu-
tion is not a suicide pact, and it surely ought not to be read as imposing an obli-
                                                          
50. See Paulsen, supra note 20.
51. See FRIED, supra note 4; McGinnis, supra note 2.
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gation upon the President to insist so rigidly on his views that he is unable to
work successfully with the other branches of government.  It thus must be per-
missible in theory for Presidents to do what they have often if not always done
in practice: appoint cautious lawyers to legal jobs in their administration that
require caution, and more zealous lawyers to jobs that will not get done without
the advocate having some “fire in his belly.”52
The pure normative departmentalist approach is thus at some level an im-
plausible one.  It is unlikely ever to describe the actual practice of executive
branch lawyering and to comport with the incentive structure that Presidents
face and that the constitutional text has created.  Whatever its abstract merits,
therefore, pure and unbending departmentalism is not a wholly satisfactory ap-
proach to these issues.
A second major normative theory that describes the role that executive
branch lawyers ought to play might be called the Court-centered approach.
This theory embraces roughly the following set of propositions:  (1) The courts
are the predominant interpreters of the Constitution but generally have the last
word on its meaning; (2) our national commitment to the Rule of Law demands
that the President and his subordinates be bound by the law; and, therefore, (3)
all legal employees of the Executive Branch should pay the utmost respect and
deference to judicial interpretations of the Constitution and the law in all of
their official actions, and it is the job of the Attorney General (and perhaps the
White House Counsel) to make sure this happens.
Again, no individual has made this argument quite so starkly, but Lincoln
Caplan has come close.53  Many who write about the role of executive branch
lawyers justifiably worry about Presidents and politicians politicizing the litiga-
tion machinery of the government, and they often react by favoring extensive
use of permanent career officials who are insulated by civil service laws or in-
dependent counsel mechanisms from the political process.  The logical culmina-
tion of this approach is former Senator Paul Simon’s proposal that the entire
Justice Department be made an independent agency headed up by an Attorney
General removable only for cause and serving perhaps a nonrenewable, ten-
year term of office.54  Under this proposal, a professionalized version of the in-
dependent counsel regime would become the norm and all litigation and law
enforcement decisions (that is, the duty and power to “take care that the Laws
                                                          
52. The phrase is usually used to describe politicians who are gutsy and crazy enough to want to
run for President.  It might also be used in this context to describe lawyers who believe passionately
enough in some kind of legal change to be willing to take substantial career risks to see it adopted.
William Bradford Reynolds and Walter Dellinger might, for quite different reasons, be fairly described
as being in this category.
53. CAPLAN, supra note 3.  The most thoughtful and qualified argument of this type that I know of
is that of my colleague Tom Merrill in this symposium issue.  See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level
“Tenured Lawyers”, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Spring 1998).
54. Such an Attorney General would be even more independent than are FBI directors in the
post-J. Edgar Hoover era.  Such directors can serve no longer than 10 years in office, but they may be
removed by the President sooner if he so chooses.
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be faithfully executed”) would be permanently removed from presidential in-
terference or control.
This argument for a professionalized and judicialized approach to law has
even been advanced with respect to judicial selection—a domain where presi-
dential prerogative would seem strongest given the President’s textually guar-
anteed power of appointment.  Thus, Ronald Reagan’s approach to judicial se-
lection was at times criticized for being too ideological,55 just as FDR’s Court-
packing plan came in for criticism as being a threat to the rule of law.56  The es-
sence of these criticisms seems to be that Presidents have no right to use their
appointment power to change the direction of the Supreme Court, at least not
in any drastic or sudden way.  Perhaps some segments of the public expect the
Supreme Court to follow the election returns, but they think Presidents ought
to pay a price if they try to make that process happen too fast or too overtly.
This conclusion requires the assumption that public support for the principle of
an independent judiciary is rightly quite strong even at times when some disa-
gree with the constitutional interpretation the judiciary is producing.
The problem with this Court-centered, conservative approach to executive
branch lawyering is that, given the incentive structure the President faces, it
bears little or no resemblance to the way the Executive Branch actually works
or is ever likely to work.  Presidents are political officials who are elected by
primary and general election voters to carry out a concrete political agenda.
Inevitably that agenda will from time to time involve problems of law enforce-
ment, constitutional amendment or reform, or other legal issues.  As noted
above, most recent presidential campaigns have involved legal issues to some
degree ranging from abortion to tort reform.  Inevitably, then, Presidents will
arrive in office with an agenda for legal change and with a desire to show their
supporters that progress on that agenda is being made.
Given our current institutional structures, this desire will inevitably be at
least partially realized.  Presidents appoint all the top level legal officials in the
Executive Branch (except for independent counsels), and they also appoint
perhaps twenty-five percent of the federal judiciary in any given four-year term
of office.  Accordingly, it is highly likely that the President’s legal agenda will
have a tremendous impact on the law-oriented institutions of the government.
This impact will be greatest in core executive offices like Office of Legal Coun-
sel and the White House Counsel’s Office but it will also and must also be felt
in the Solicitor General’s Office, and in the litigating and law enforcement divi-
sions.  Different policies on abortion, domestic violence, civil rights, federalism,
economic liberties, environmental law, and other issues must be and will be re-
spected throughout all the legal arms of the Executive Branch as one admini-
stration comes and another goes.  Any theory of executive branch lawyering
                                                          
55. See GOLDMAN, supra note 31; SCHWARTZ, supra note 30.
56. See S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 14 (1937), reprinted in FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 37, at 94-96
(blasting FDR’s Court-packing plan as having the real purpose of making “this [g]overnment one of
men rather than one of law” and as “a measure which should be so emphatically rejected that its par-
allel will never again be presented to the free representatives of the free people of America”).
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that does not or that cannot account for or justify this practice is fundamentally
at odds with reality.  The Constitution itself sets up the very incentive structure
for Presidents that guarantees they will bring fresh popular insights about law
into Washington at regular four-year and especially eight-year intervals.
This is not to deny the wisdom of the highly sophisticated argument for ten-
ured lawyers that my colleague Tom Merrill sets out elsewhere in this sympo-
sium issue.57  To the extent Presidents are worried about winning cases here and
now, and all Presidents care about that to some extent, there are powerful rea-
sons to have tenured, high-level lawyers around (or at least not to fire these
lawyers, who in fact occupy policymaking positions that under Article II are
always subject to presidential removal at will).  Moreover, as Professor Merrill
argues, the very institution of the presidency and other government institutions
as well do often benefit from having the insights available due to a career law-
yer’s beneficially long-term perspective.
Nevertheless, the presidency and the government also benefit from the pe-
riodic infusions of fresh blood that come into the Executive Branch as a result
of the constitutionally imposed two-term limit58 and of the tradition, dating
back to Andrew Jackson and George Washington, that every President picks
his own Cabinet and other policymaking officials.59  This 200-year-old Ameri-
can tradition contrasts favorably with the British and European traditions of
government-by-the-permanent-bureaucracy.60  Academics know well that just
as there is a benefit to having tenured people around with years of experience
and a long-term perspective, so too there is a benefit to bringing in fresh blood.
The principles of both rotation in office or term limits, and of a professional-
ized career civil service, have deep roots in this country and serve important
values.61  I sincerely doubt that either will ever or should ever completely pre-
vail over the other.
The constitutionally combined policymaking and law-execution functions of
the Executive Branch almost guarantee that we will never have an Article II
regime of either pure term limits or pure tenure.  For this reason, even unitary
executive theorists have conceded that tenure guarantees are permissible and
may be even desirable for executive officials in non-policymaking ministerial
positions.  Once again, the constitutional structure itself, the incentives it cre-
ates, and the way those incentives have played out historically combine to sug-
                                                          
57. See Merrill, supra note 53.
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
59. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997).
60. See Steven G. Calabresi, “The Era of Big Government is Over”, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1035
(1998) (book review); accord ALAN BRINKLEY, ET AL., THE NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN
DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 45-49 (1997) (Nelson W. Polsby).
61. The Jacksonian insistence on rotation in office clearly has deep resonance in our constitutional
tradition as the strength of the modern day movement for term limits indicates.  At the same time,
support for a professionalized career civil service dates back to the 1880s, and in some ways to the first
six Presidents all of whom exercised their removal power very sparingly out of a desire to create a pro-
fessionalized civil service administration.  See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 59.
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gest that a pure Court-centered conservative role for executive branch lawyers
is as unrealistic as it would be to expect the President to want to fire all of the
career policymaking officials he is constitutionally empowered to fire.
Former Solicitor General Charles Fried, recognizing the flaws inherent in
both of the two theories discussed, recently proposed what is in essence a third
theory: Burkean representationalism.62  Fried explains that he regarded his job
as Solicitor General as being in essence an ambassadorial one.  He viewed him-
self as being a Burkean representative or ambassador from the Reagan Ad-
ministration to a quite different and often hostile Supreme Court.  In that role,
he believed he had an obligation to think independently, creatively, and with
his own best judgment about what parts of the Reagan legal agenda should be
pushed or which, for strategic reasons, should be abandoned.  This third theory
of the role of an executive branch lawyer comports with the role that some past
Solicitors General appear to have played, as Fried’s occasional references to
Victor Navasky’s book Kennedy Justice illustrate.63
The executive branch lawyer as Burkean-independent-thinker, ambassador,
and translator is an inevitable role for at least some executive branch lawyers.
All lawyers sometimes play such a role when they independently present their
client’s interests in the manner they deem most likely to be well received.  In
Fried’s case, however, as in Stanley Reed’s64 case during the first Franklin Roo-
sevelt Administration, the gap in the visions of constitutional law held by their
presidential client and a majority of the Supreme Court was arguably so large
that anyone who tried to span it would find himself carving out a third interme-
diate judicial philosophy.65  This, Fried admits, is what he did when he tried to
get the originalist Reaganites and the evolutionary Brennanites to meet at a
Harlanesque middle ground.
Fried’s effort was sometimes successful and sometimes not, often for rea-
sons that were largely beyond his or the Reagan Administration’s ability to
control.  Yet the effort was probably inevitable, given both the extraordinary
gap that had opened up between the legal views of the President and the Court,
and the Administration’s imperative need not to lose every case upon which
certiorari was granted while it embarked upon its long-term project of success-
fully changing the face of American law.  While some Reaganites were laying
the groundwork for the successful and revolutionary revival of federalism and
separation of powers that has partially come to fruition in cases like United
                                                          
62. See FRIED, supra note 4.
63. See the discussion of Archibald Cox’s tenure as Robert F. Kennedy’s Solicitor General in
VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 277-323 (1971).
64. Reed was FDR’s first Solicitor General, who, according to legend, picked Humphrey’s Execu-
tor as his first case to argue because he was sure it could not be lost.  Of course, to his and FDR’s great
irritation and chagrin, the government lost.  See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN 64 (1995).
65. For a thought-provoking discussion of mistakes in lawyering during the first Franklin Roose-
velt Administration, see Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237
(1996).
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States v. Lopez,66 Printz v. United States,67 City of Boerne v. Flores,68 Washington
v. Glucksberg,69 and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,70 others had to engage in
damage control in cases like Bowsher v. Synar,71 Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,72 and Schweiker v. Chilicky.73  Fried met this challenge powerfully and
with a great deal of theoretical flair, and if the briefs that resulted were not al-
ways pleasing to me or to other Reaganite originalists at the time, they were
more pleasing than Rex Lee’s briefs and, in retrospect, they were the best that
could be hoped for at that very difficult period.
Every administration will likely have within it some lawyers who are ardent
administration advocates, some who are cautious Court-oriented conservatives,
and some who are peacemaking ambassadors representing the administration’s
views to the outside and transmitting the responses back.  Lawyers will gravi-
tate toward these roles in part based on their personalities and on what they
feel comfortable doing but also in part on the basis of their claim to expertise
and status within the administration.
Every executive branch lawyer has a constituency he has an incentive to
please and a reputation with that constituency he wants to maintain.  As Pro-
fessor Merrill rightly notes, tenured career lawyers have an incentive to worry
about their long-term reputational capital with the Courts and the judges who
sit on them and will make short-term sacrifices accordingly.  This admirably
serves the Executive Branch’s interest in short-term litigation victories but, as
Merrill notes, may disserve concerns of democratic accountability.  It is in the
class interest of career lawyers to pretend that victory today in court is the be-
all-and-end-all of successful Article II lawyering.  The lawyers’ court-win rec-
ords are also their “meal tickets;” so they will flaunt their successful records
with pride at their here-today-gone-tomorrow bosses.
Conversely, ardent “administration advocates” have a strong incentive to
worry relatively more about maintaining their reputation within the administra-
tion and its electoral and interest group coalitions.  In my experience, the Rea-
gan Administration advocates were less likely to brag about the last time they
had gotten Lewis Powell’s vote and more likely to talk about how they were
with Reagan way back in 1976.  The advocate’s claim to fame and power rests
significantly on perceived loyalty to the Administration’s legal agenda and elec-
toral platform, as well as honesty, effectiveness, and trustworthiness in carrying
those things out.  A good and effective advocate and a good and loyal Court-
oriented conservative will usually and should usually arrive at similar conclu-
                                                          
66. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
67. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
68. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
69. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
70. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
71. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
72. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
73. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
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sions, but given the incentive structure he faces, the former is obviously a more
reliable agent of democratic accountability.
Ambassadorial lawyers by definition have an interest and an incentive in
creating and finding middle ground.  They thrive in situations like those en-
countered by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Reagan where there is a sharp
difference between the administration’s legal views and the judiciary’s, and
they have an incentive to maintain a state of Cold War so their peacemaking
services will remain in demand.  A good ambassador has to be empathetic and
be able to see legal issues from a variety of perspectives so he can frame his ar-
guments and theories accordingly.  This can be dizzingly complicated at the
level of the Solicitor General’s office.
Obviously, there are good and bad versions of the lawyers who fit these
three types.  A bad advocate is an unqualified partisan hack; a bad Court-
centered lawyer is a lazy recalcitrant bureaucrat; and a bad ambassador is a
lawyer who has spent so much time with the other side that he has either “gone
native” or is in effect a double agent.  Conversely, a good advocate is a Lincoln
taking on Dred Scott74 or a Robert Jackson taking on the nine old men;75 a good
Court-oriented conservative is a Leon Jaworski bringing Richard Nixon to jus-
tice; and a good ambassador is an Archibald Cox arguing for justiciability in
Baker v. Carr.76  All three types will always exist in every administration and
the respective roles can be played as admirably or as badly as the participants
so choose.
One constant feature, in any administration, is that certain legal officers and
offices are more likely to play distinct roles.  For example, in recent years, the
White House Counsel’s office, to its great peril, and to a lesser extent, the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel have tended to have more advocate-type lawyers.  It is no
accident that both John Dean and Vince Foster worked in the White House
Counsel’s office and that Abe Fortas was a former White House lawyer.  Nor is
it an accident that advocates William H. Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia went
from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Supreme Court, as have many advocate
Attorneys General77 and at least one advocate Deputy Attorney General.78
Similarly, the career staff in the litigating and law enforcement divisions has
always contained a fair number of Court-oriented conservatives.  It is no sur-
prise that I have been told that many career lawyers during the Carter Admini-
stration were unhappy about their Administration’s unwillingness to raise
standing problems in litigation (because of theoretical objections to the doc-
trine), just as many career lawyers during the Reagan years were unhappy
about the Administration’s willingness to promote anti-federal power legal po-
                                                          
74. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
75. See JACKSON, supra note 27.
76. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
77. For example, Roger B. Taney, James C. McReynolds, and Robert H. Jackson.
78. Byron White.
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sitions on economic liberty or federalism.79  For these officials, a Senior Execu-
tive Service career Deputy position is a long-sought-after and hard-earned
prize, and there is bound to be resentment over the fact that in this country we
have civilian control of the Civil Service just as we have civilian control of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Finally, certain offices like the Solicitor General’s office or the Offices of
Congressional Relations or of Public Affairs are always likely to attract ambas-
sadorial lawyers.  The heads of these offices are ambassadors from one branch
to another branch or to some public audience that the President or the Attor-
ney General cares about.  The tensions that exist are more likely at some times
than at others to require ambassadorial talent, but even in normal periods some
measure of diplomatic skill (and ability to wear formal attire) is required.
Some Presidents will not need to have an ambassador in these jobs,80 and others
will choose not to for various reasons.81  As a general matter, however, these of-
fices seem likely to attract lawyers with an ambassadorial frame of mind or to
create such lawyers by the incentive structure presented to them.
The modern trend toward split-party control of the White House and Sen-
ate also has had a tendency to push an administration’s legal advocates into
non-confirmation jobs, such as those in the White House Counsel’s office.  This
explains the role that Boyden Gray and Bernard Nussbaum are reported to
have played in selecting Supreme Court nominees during the Bush and Clinton
administrations, respectively.  Formerly, decisions of that importance were
more often made by the Attorney General, but the lessons learned from Wa-
tergate and the trend toward split-party control have seemed to force recent
administrations to place their advocate lawyers in the White House “bunker”
itself rather than in the Justice Department.
This trend is very unfortunate.  The traditions and career personnel of the
Justice Department teach important lessons to political appointees, and the
those appointees bring fresh air into the Department.  The physical separation
of these different types of lawyers into different buildings on Pennsylvania
Avenue should be resisted, because each of the three types has an important
role to play and needs the moderating influences of the others.  For this reason,
and others, it is fortunate that our Justice Department is organized as it is.  The
tendency for either Court-oriented conservatives or ambassadorial types to
take over the Justice Department should be resisted, just as a check should be
maintained on military officers at the Pentagon or on the striped pants crowd at
the State Department.  Civilian control of the government is an important prin-
                                                          
79. See FRIED, supra note 4, at 182-88.
80. For example, Presidents Franklin Roosevelt (after 1937) and Lyndon Johnson, throughout his
tenure in office, could afford to appoint ardent advocates to serve as Solicitors General because they
had solid majorities in both houses of Congress as well as strong support from a solid majority of the
Supreme Court.  FDR appointed ardent advocates to serve as Solicitors General during this period,
and LBJ appointed Thurgood Marshall to succeed JFK’s Solicitor General, Archibald Cox.
81. President Gerald R. Ford, a militant moderate Republican, chose to retain the arch-
conservative, Nixon-appointed advocate Solicitor General Robert H. Bork, who completed his time in
that office under the supervision of Ford’s eclectic Attorney General, Edward H. Levi.
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ciple of our democracy and that principle applies to legal policy as well as to
foreign and defense policy.
The key flaw of the normative writing on the role of executive branch law-
yers is that it tends to assume that one of the three roles is best even though all
three are inevitable and will always co-exist.  The three roles are inevitable be-
cause of the tripartite structure of the government, because each role serves
important if at times conflicting values of democratization and professionalism,
and because different lawyers will have different temperaments and will face
different incentive structures.
At the same time, different circumstances will be relevant because some
Administrations will take office during a relatively nonpartisan era of good
feelings, like James Monroe’s, while others will come in during a constitutional
moment, as happened with Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Reagan,
or during a period when rule of law values are paramount, as they were for
President Ford.  Different Presidents will have different needs and ambitions,
and different circumstances will thus produce different ratios of advocates,
Court-centered conservatives, and ambassadors.  The three types are simply
inherent in our Constitution, our needs as a people, and in the personalities and
incentives of the executive branch lawyers who are hired to work as our agents.
III
CONCLUSION
This essay has argued that all executive branch lawyers to some degree feel
the pull of conflicting loyalties to two quite different centers of power: that rep-
resented by the President and that represented by the Supreme Court.  Some
executive branch lawyers are predominantly loyal to the President, and they
become his advocates.  Others are predominantly loyal to the Court, and they
become a restraining influence.  Still others are peacemakers and mediators
who try to negotiate compromises between the first two groups.  Membership
in these groups often depends on whether one holds a political or a civil service
position.  Political appointees can be cautious and Court-oriented,82 and civil
service appointees can be ardent administration advocates.83
This essay began with a quote from Professor Bruce Ackerman, who offers
us the metaphor of the Supreme Court as the caboose (and controller of the
breaks) on the train that is our federal government.  In Ackerman’s metaphor,
which I only partially endorse,84 the Court is pulled along behind the policy-
                                                          
82. For example, Rex Lee, President Reagan’s first Solicitor General.
83. For example, now-Professor Gary Lawson, who held a career-reserved position in the Reagan
Office of Legal Counsel even though he is an ardent and pure originalist.
84. The implication of Ackerman’s metaphor that I find misleading is his suggestion that the Court
always treats recent events like the New Deal as being more important than older events like the
Founding.  To the contrary, as I have explained elsewhere, I believe the Supreme Court for the last 40
years has been deemphasizing New Deal constitutionalism and returning to pre-1937 insights.  See
Calabresi, supra note 7, at 258-61.  For an explanation of why the American people might repeatedly
CALABRESI.FMT 12/31/98  12:13 PM
82 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 61: No. 1
making branches following dutifully if belatedly the direction in which the poli-
cymakers have been told to go by the people, or have otherwise chosen to go.
This metaphor, besides being descriptively accurate in this respect, seems apt in
describing the orientation of the three types of government lawyers.  Some of
them are interested only in looking backwards and in servicing the caboose.
Others can see or argue about only the path ahead and fight over access to the
locomotive.  Still others move from one end of the train to the other, facilitat-
ing communications and conducting negotiations between the engineers in the
locomotive and the brakemen in the caboose.
                                                          
tell the Supreme Court to return to originalist/textual constitutional principles, see Steven G.
Calabresi, supra note 23.
